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IMPACT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW ON
FEDERAL TAXATION
J. W. Riehm, Jr.*
T HE impact of the basic concepts of community property law
upon the development of the law of federal taxation has been
tremendous. The most recent, and perhaps most significant exam-
ples of this influence are the present income splitting and marital
deduction provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Other effects
are to be found in the development of the devices used in com-
mon law states to split income among members of the family,
viz., assignments, trust and family partnerships. These cone-
quences have been the result, not of a single collision between
the community property concepts and taxation concepts, but of
a series of contacts which have served to deflect the law of federal
taxation from its anticipated course.
1914-1930
The first contact between federal taxation concepts and com-
munity property concepts came in the very early days of the
development of the former. In December 1914 and January
1915 the Treasury Department had said "the income of husband
and wife should not be combined in a return of income for the
purpose of assessing the additional or surtax" and "the additional
or surtax imposed by the act will be computed on the basis of the
income of each individual."' When the question was raised of how
the income of a husband and wife residing in Texas and Washing-
ton should be treated the Bureau published Office Decision 426
in April 1920.2 That OD stated that in Texas and Washington the
husband wife might divide the income from community property
*Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
ITDs 2090 (Dec. 14, 1914), 2137 (Jan. 30, 1915).
2 Cum. Bull. No. 2, p. 198.
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and report it separately notwithstanding the husband's right of
management and control because the husband and wife jointly
owned the community property from which the income was de-
rived. However, the OD stated that "[a] husband and wife may
not divide the salary of the husband or the wife for the purpose
of reporting such salary in separate returns for income tax pur-
poses" and income from separate property had to be reported
by the spouse owning the separate property. The latter statements
were extracted almost verbatim from OD 285' which bad been
published a short time earlier. Thus, as of April 1920 there was
only a partial recognition of the community property system for
federal income tax purposes.
On August 12, 1920 the Secretary of the Treasury addressed
a communication to the Attorney General in which he requested
an answer to three questions, all pertaining to the filing of separate
returns of husbands and wives in Texas, (1) are the earnings of
the husband and the wife community income, (2) is income from
separate property community income and (3) is income from
community property community income? The Attorney General,
A. Mitchell Palmer, in his opinion of September 10, 1920 an-
swered all three questions in the affirmative,' thus indicating that
the husband and wife in Texas could file separate returns and
split all their income between those returns. The opinion was
adopted by the Bureau and promulgated as Treasury Decision
3071. The Secretary of the Treasury then requested an opinion
as to the rule to be applied in all the other community property
states,' as well as the rule to be applied in determining what por-
tion of the community property was to be included in the gross
estate of a deceased spouse for estate tax purposes.! On February
8 Cum. Bull. No. 1, p. 189.
' 32 Ops. Atty. Gen. 298.
5 Cum. Bull. No. 3, p. 221.
6 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico and Washington.
IIn 1917 the Bureau had announced in TD 2450 (19 Treasury Division, Int. Rev.
p. 38) that in Texas only one-half of the community property was to be "treated as
the estate of the decedent husband."
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26, 1921 Attorney General Palmer replied to the Secretary,'
stating "that all the community property states except California
[had held through] their courts that the wife has, during the
existence of the marriage relations, a vested interest in one-half
of the community property"9 and for that reason his conclusions
as to Texas, formulated in his opinion of September 10, 1920,
were applicable to all states except California. He further stated
that in all community property states except California only one-
half of the community property would be included in the gross
estate of the deceased spouse."0 Immediately upon receipt of the
Attorney General's opinion it was adopted by the Bureau and
promulgated as TD 3138. Thus, husbands and wives in all states
except California were allowed to split the community income
and to include only one-half of the community property in the
gross estate of the first to die. The reason underlying the rule was
the existence at that point in time in the evolution of the concept
of taxable income that the tax was to be levied on the owner of
the property. And since the state courts had said that the wife
had a vested interest she was deemed to be the owner of one-half
of the community property for tax purposes.
The Treasury was dissatisfied with the state of the law as inter-
preted by the Attorney General and attempted to change it by
suggesting the insertion of a provision in the Revenue Act of 1921
to the effect that "income received by any community shall be
included in the gross income of the spouse having the manage-
ment and control of the community property." That provision
was included in the bill which was to become the Revenue Act
of 1921 when it was sent from the House to the Senate." The
provision was modified slightly in the Senate Finance Committee"8
8 37 Ops. Atty. Gen. 435.
*Id, 458.
1I ld 463.
11 Cum. Bull. No. 4, p. 238.
12 §208 67th Cong. let Session, 1921, Report of the Senate Committee on Finance.
18 61 CoNG. REc. 5909 (1921).
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and eliminated on the floor of the Senate. 14 Another attempt to
insert a similar provision in the Revenue Act of 1924 failed in
the House Committee on Ways and Means. t"
The Treasury was not the only one dissatisfied with the Attorney
General's interpretation of the law; the married citizens of
California were outraged that the Bureau had adopted the At-
torney General's opinion which had concluded that California
wives did not have the same status as wives in other community
property states. They found support for their contention that they
should receive the same treatment as husbands and wives in the
other community property states in the case of Blunt v. Wardell.t"
That was a California case which involved the question of whether
the one-half of the community property taken by the wife on the
death of the husband should be included in the latter's gross estate
for federal tax purposes. The U. S. District Court held that only
one-half the community property should be included in the de-
ceased husband's gross estate, saying:
"The claim of the government is inequitable at best. It is conceded
that the interest of the surviving wife in community property in other
community property states is exempt from the estate tax under identical
laws, and nothing short of some imperative controlling necessity would
justify a court in upholding the tax in a single state. I find no such
obstacle in the way of administering equal and-impartial justice in this
case, and the demurrer is overruled." 1
After affirmance by the Circuit Court of Appeals"8 the Govern-
ment petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari which
was enied in March 1922."9 The outcome of the Blum case
1 61 CONG. REC. 5922. 7229 (1921).
15 67 CONG. REC. 175-176. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, House
Reports, Revenue Revision 1924, pp. 194, 348, 349, 375, 478, 482.
16 270 Fed. 309 (D.C.. N.D. Cal. 1920).
17 Id. at 314.
18 276 Fed. 226 (CA -9. 1921).
19 258 U. S. 617, 42 S. Ct. 271 (1922). In April 1922 the Solicitor General made a
motion in the Supreme Court to revoke the order denying the petition for certiorari
and to allow the petition to remain unacted upon until the California Supreme Court
decided a case, Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 218 Pac. 22 (1923) which involved a determina-
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prompted the Secretary of the Treasury to ask the Attorney Gen-
eral to reconsider that portion of the latter's opinion of February
26, 1921 which concluded that the wife did not have a vested
interest in the community property in California. In his reply
dated March 8, 192420 the Attorney General reviewed the earlier
opinion, the legislative enactments of California, state court deci-
sions and Blum v. Wardell and then amended the opinion of
February 26, 1921 to comply with Blum v. Wardell. On the basis
of that opinion the Bureau issued TD 3568" on March 26, 1924,
which directed the Collectors in California to allow California
husbands and wives to split the reporting of community income
between their separate returns. However, the California victory
was short-lived because the Secretary of the Treasury then asked
the Attorney General to recall the opinion of March 8 for further
consideration and review. That was done on May 27, 1924 and
on May 31, 1924 the Bureau published TD 359622 which noted
that the March 8 opinion had been recalled and directed that
"the auditing and closing upon a community property basis of
both income and estate tax cases arising in the State of California
will be held in abeyance pending further consideration of the
matter by the Attorney General."2
On October 9, 1924 the new Attorney General, Harlan F. Stone
(later Associate Justice and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court)
reaffirmed the opinion of March 824 but in so doing said:
"My action in so doing must be construed as limited to the precise
question presented in that opinion as to the incidence of the Federal
estate tax upon the interest of the wife in community property on the
death of the husband. I express no opinion with respect to the prin-
tion of the extent of the wife's interest in California community property. The Solicitor
General's motion remained pending until October 1923 (after the Roberts decision)
when it was withdrawn. (34 Ops. Atty. Gen. 396).
20 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 376.
21 III- Cum. Bull. 84.
22111-1 Cum. Bull. 101.
23 Id. at 102.
24 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 395.
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ciples which govern the taxation of income derived from community
property."25
On receipt of Attorney General Stone's opinion the Secretary
of the Treasury inquired of him as to the scope of the opinion.
In a letter dated January 27, 1925 the Attorney General said:
"In reply to your inquiry, I have to say that my opinion of October
9, relating to community property in California, treats only of the inci-
dence of estate tax upon the wife's share of such community property
of which she assumes possession at her husband's death. In no way
does it touch upon the question as to whether the husband and wife
may make separate returns of the income from their community estate.
That phase of the matter is therefore as open as it ever was in California
and you are free to litigate it by appropriate legal proceedings. 26
Thus the opportunity to litigate the question was presented and
the Bureau chose to proceed, giving notice by TD 3670,27 dated
February 7, 1925.
The test case was immediately begun in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California and a judg-
ment obtained in April 1925.8 It was an action by the executors
of the estate of one R. D. Robbins against the United States to
recover income taxes paid by the decedent for the year 1918
when the Collector refused to accept separate returns filed by
the decedent and his wife (in which they had split the community
income) and insisted that the tax be assessed as if the income
all belonged to the decedent. The District Court held the wife had
a vested interest in the community income and ordered the refund.
The case was taken directly to the Supreme Court and argued in
December 1925.
It must be noted at this point that prior to 1925 there had been
little disagreement as to the underlying theory of taxability. While
the various Revenue Acts had simply said that a tax should be
2 Id. at 405.
26 IV-1 Cum. Bull. 25.
2? IV-1 Cum. Bull. 19.
28 Robbins v. United States. 5 F. (2d) 690 (1925).
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levied, collected and paid for each taxable year upon the net
income of every individual, etc., the phrase "income of" was
interpreted to mean income owned by the individual. Ownership
was the test of taxability, and one determined ownership by refer-
ence to established legal concepts. Consequently, reference to the
law of the community property states was appropriate to deter-
mine who owned the income being received by the marital com-
munity, and one cannot say that the contact established between
tax concepts and community property concepts resulted in a clash
of theories at that time. However, it becomes apparent as we re-
view the evolution of the concept of taxable income that at about
that point in time some question arose as to whether taxability
of income should be limited by the concept of ownership. The
statement by the Commisioner in TD 3670 to the effect that:
".... there is grave doubt of the legality of these regulations, [which
permit income splitting] since the husband has complete control of the
community income and may dispose of it as he sees fit during his life.
time without the consent of his wife. It is obviously a somewhat strained
construction to consider that the husband has received only one-half
of his earnings for income tax purposes although he controls for prao-
tical purposes the whole.' 29
when viewed in retrospect indicates an intention to broaden the
concept of taxable income which escaped the eyes of many at the
time it was published. Consequently, it is not strange that neither
Government counsel nor counsel for the taxpayers alluded to the
question of control referred to by the Commissioner in TD 3670,
in the course of their presentation of the Robbins case to the Su-
preme Court. Yet when the decision reversing the District Court
was announced less than a month later30 Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinion contained the following significant statement:
"Even if we are wrong as to the law of California and assume that
the wife had an interest in the community income that Congress could
tax if so minded, it does not follow that Congress could not tax the
29 IV-1I Cur. Bull 19.
50 269 U. S. 315,46 Sup. Ct. 148 (1926).
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husband for the whole. Although restricted in the matter of gifts, etc.,
he alone has the disposition of the fund. He may spend it substantially
as he chooses, and if he wastes it in debauchery the wife has no redress.
See Garrozi v. Dastas, 204 U. S. 64. His liability for his wife's support
comes from a different source and exists whether there is community
property or not. That he may be taxed for such a fund seems to us to
need no argument. The same and further considerations lead to the
conclusion that it was intended to tax him for the whole. For not only
should he who has all the power bear the burden, and not only is the
husband the most obvious target for the shaft, but the fund taxed,
while liable to be taken for his debts, is not liable to be taken for the
wife's, Civil Code, § 167, so that the remedy for her failure to pay might
be hard to find. The reasons for holding him are at least as strong as
those for holding trustees in the cases where they are liable under the
law."
31
The responses to the decision were those we have come to ex-
pect, i.e., action by the Bureau, action by Congress and autopsies
in the form of law review articles. On February 3, 1926, the
Bureau asked the Attorney General to reconsider his opinions of
September 10, 1920 and February 26, 1921, referred to above.
Next, Congress added Section 1212 to the Revenue Act of 1926,
which provided as follows:
"Income for any period before January 1, 1925, of a marital com-
munity in the income of which the wife has a vested interest as dis-
tinguished from an expectancy, shall be held to be correctly returned
by the spouse to whom the income belonged under the state law appli-
cable to such marital community for such period. Any spouse who
elected so to return such income shall not be entitled to any credit or
refund on the ground that such income should have been returned by
the other spouse."
Thus, the question of the effect of the Robbins decision on tax-
payers in the other seven community property states was set at
rest for the tax years behind January 1, 1925.
Simultaneously, the Attorney General was engaged in gather-
ing evidence to determine whether the Robbins decision should
81 Id. at 327.
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apply to the other seven community property states. To obtain
the information, he held public hearings and asked for and re-
ceived detailed briefs from attorneys in those states on the ques-
tion of the intrinsic nature of the wife's interest in the community
income in each of the states. 2 On July 23, 1927 the Acting At-
torney General, William D. Mitchell, addressed an opinion to
the Secretary of the Treasury"3 in which he stated that his investi-
gation convinced him "that the problems presented can not be
settled by an opinion of the Attorney General and that the situa-
tion makes it inappropriate under established precedents for me
to express any conclusions," whereupon he withdrew the opinions
of September 10, 1920 and February 26, 1921 "in order to leave
you free, as has been done in similar situations, to arrange for
test cases in the courts or otherwise deal with the matter as you
may think proper." The Bureau immediately began test suits in
Texas, Louisiana, Arizona and Washington which culminated in
the Supreme Court decision in Poe v Seaborn and its companion
cases. 4 Poe v. Seaborn involved the question of whether all the in-
come of a Washington community had to be included in the hus-
band's return or might be split between the spouses. The Commis-
sioner denied the husband and wife the right to split the income,
Seaborn paid a tax on the entire income under protest and then
brought suit for refund. While the cases were pending the Bureau
issued Mimeograph 3723"5 which indicated that it did not propose
to go behind the tax year 1927 if it was successful in the test suit
and that attitude was affirmed by a letter from Secretary Mellon
to Congressman Garner in 1929."
The import of Mr. Justice Holmes' words quoted above to the
82 See, Donworth, Taxation of Community Income, 4 WASH. L REv. 145, 163-164
(1929).
88 35 Op. Atty. Gen. 265.
84282 U. S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930); TEXt, Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122, 51
S. Ct. 62 (1930) ; LOUISIANA, Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64 (1930);
ARIZONA, Goodell v. Koch, 282 U. S. 118, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930).
a5 VIII-1 Cum. Bull. 89.
38 Note 32, supra, p. 169.
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effect that the husband might be taxed on the whole of the income
even though the California courts were to hold the wife had a
vested interest was lost to most of the readers of his decision.
The Attorney General in his opinion of July 16, 1927 to the
Secretary of the Treasury said: "The Revenue Acts of the United
States have been so drafted as to require the husband to return
and pay income tax on the community income if that income
belongs to him . . ."" Of the legal authorities available to the
writer for examination only one explored the scope of Mr. Justice
Holmes' words, and came to the conclusion that although there
might be a constitutional ground for taxing income to the bene-
ficial owner thereof, the husband in the Robbins case was not the
beneficial owner of all the community income."8 Only the Bureau
seemed to grasp the significance of the words for it said in Mim.
3723: "The position of the Bureau is that community income can
not be divided for income tax purposes but must be returned,
and the tax in respect thereof paid, by the spouse (usually the
husband) having under the laws of the State the management and
control thereof." 9 It must therefore have sounded strange to hear
the Solicitor General arguing before the Supreme Court in Poe
v. Seaborn that "[t]axation of income to the preson who controls
and enjoys it, rather than to the person who holds title to the
property from which it is derived, is a principle which is recog-
nized in various provisions of the Revenue Acts."4
The opinion of the Court in Poe v. Seaborn was the first written
by Mr. Justice Roberts and indicated the approach he was to take
to nearly every tax case presented to the Court during his tenure,
whether expressed as a majority opinion or in a dissent. The
decision was for the taxpayer, allowing the splitting of the com-
munity income between the spouses, and was based on the pre-
37 Note 33, supra, p. 266.
88 Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 351
and 441 (1926). See also an excellent note, 4 TEx. L. REv. 371 (1926) ; and note, 39
HARv. L. REv. 762 (1926).
s9 Note 35, supra, p. 90.
40 282 U. S. 101. 103.
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mise that the word "of" in the phrase "tax upon the net income
of the individual" denotes ownership. After stating his premise,
and without offering proof to bulwark it, Mr. Justice Roberts then
turned to the state law to show that the wife owned one-half the
community income. In answer to the Government's contention
that the husband should be taxed because he had control Mr.
Justice Roberts said that the control was merely that of an agent,
and he then distinguished the Robbins case on the ground that the
wife's interest in California was a mere expectancy as compared
with a vested interest in Washington.
The interesting question posed by Poe v. Seaborn is one which
will never be answered, viz., what prompted, or why did Mr.
Justice Holmes remain silent while the new Justice completely
ignored a concept of taxable income which Holmes had apparently
been developing with great care? A reference to Holmes' dissent-
ing opinion in Eisner v. Macober41 indicates that he did not feel
the concept of taxable income should be limited by legal niceties.
He said:
"I think that the word 'incomes' in the Sixteenth Amendment should
be read in 'a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the
time of its adoption.' Bishop v. State, 149 Indiana, 223, 230; State v.
Butler, 70 Florida, 102, 133. For it was for public adoption that it was
proposed. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 407. The known pur-
pose of this Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what
might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that most people not lawyers
would suppose when they voted for it that they put a question like the
present to rest." 42
He then made the statement in the Robbins case, quoted above,
to the effect that he who has all the power should bear the burden
of the tax. And in the very year in which Poe v. Seaborn was
decided Holmes had further developed the concept that control
could be the basis for levying the tax in his opinions in the cases
41252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
42 Id. at 219.
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of Lucas v. Earl,"' and Corliss v. Bowers." In Lucas v. Earl he
said:
"But this case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns
on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is
no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrange-
ments and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary
when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.
That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that
no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the
arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from
that on which they grew.'"'"
In Corliss v. Bowers he said:
"But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title
as it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual bene-
fit for which the tax is paid. * * * The income that is subject to a man's
unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own option may
be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not."' 6
In an article entitled The Taxation of Family Income47 Pro-
fessor Bruton pointed out the underlying weakness of the rationale
of the opinion in Poe v. Seaborn when he said:
"This 'vested interest' argument was based upon the common law
theory of ownership embodied in the conception of legal title. It was
a theory which was inept and inadequate to describe community prop-
erty relations which were developed under an alien jurisprudence. It
had no real connection with the tax problem involved which should
have been approached from the standpoint of the taxpayer's actual
relation to the income for which he was taxed."' 8
An excellent case note on Poe v. Seaborn supports Professor
3 281 U. S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930).
44281 U. S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930).
45281 U. S. 111, 115, 50 S. Ct. 241, 249.
46 281 U. S. 376, 378, 50 S. Ct. 336-337.
4741 YALE L. J. 1172 (1932).
481 d. at 1173.
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Bruton's statement by pointing out the impossibility of differen-
tiating between it and Lucas v. Earl on technical grounds. 9
The immediate effect of the decision in Poe v. Seaborn and its
companion cases so far as the taxpayers in community property
states were concerned was to secure the right of the husband and
wife to divide the community income between them against the
attack of the Bureau (California having finally patched up its
law to conform with that of the other seven"e). The more far-
reaching effects of the decision were not immediately significant.
Yet when viewed in retrospect one can see that the decision con-
stituted a climax, of a sort, in the conflict; the conflict between
the evolving concepts of taxation and the older concepts of com-
munity property law, which had been increasing in intensity over
the ten year period from 1920 to 1930, and from which the con-
cepts of taxation emerged second best.
1931-1950
The next, and more dramatic climax in the conflict between the
two sets of concepts was reached some fifteen years later, in 1945,
after the conflict had died to a dull rumble in the early '30s and
then began to intensify again. The period from 1932 to 1942 was
marked by the initial criticism of the Supreme Court's decision
in Poe v. Seaborn noted above, a series of attempts on the part
of the Treasury and others to obtain uniformity of taxation be-
tween married individuals in community and non-community pro-
perty states by Congressional action, a further development of
federal tax concepts and a growing recognition that the theory
underlying the decision in Poe v. Seaborn and those new tax con-
cepts were irreconcilable.
The Bureau's answer to Poe v. Seaborn was encompassed with-
in the broad scope of proposals submitted to Congress in connec-
49 44 HARv. L Rim. 652 (1931).
50 United States v. Malcolm, 282 U. S. 792, 51 S. Ct. 184 (1931) ; Comment, 4 So.
CALir. L REv. 395 (1931); ct. Hirsch v. United States, 62 F (2d) 128 (1932), note,
22 CALiF. L. REv. 106 (1933).
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tion with the Revenue Act of 1934. As Professor Bruton had
pointed out in his article 1 the depression had prompted indivi-
duals to use every method at their disposal to minimize their taxes.
Such activity called for a tightening up of the tax laws, and in
furtherance of that plan the Bureau submitted to the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means in December 1933 a proposal that
the Revenue Act of 1934 contain a provision for mandatory filing
of joint returns. The proposal offered certain advantages not
present in the earlier (1921 and 1924) proposals the Bureau had
made for taxing the community income to the spouse who earned
or controlled it. Thus, mandatory filing of joint returns would
(1) remove, in the non-community property states, the discrimi-
nation against the family whose income was earned by one spouse
rather than by both, (2) remove, in the non-community property
states, the discrimination against the family which lived off earned
income and could not achieve division of that income because of
the rule of Lucas v. Earl as could the family whose income was
derived from investments, (3) negate in larger measure the use
of family partnerships, gifts and trusts used to obtain a division
of income and (4) tax husbands and wives in community and
non-community property states alike. The proposal was not
adopted by the Ways and Means Committee. It was recommended
by the Bureau again in 1937 but again the Committee failed to
adopt it. On recommendation by the Bureau a third time in 1941
it was finally adopted by the Committee but it failed to pass the
House." Congress also had before it during that period proposals
for solving the community property dilemma by taxing the com-
munity income to the spouse who earned or controlled it (the
proposal which had been submitted by the Bureau in 1921 and
1924) and by allowing the equal division of income between all
51 Note 47. supra.
52 Conference Report on Revenue Bill of 1941, H. R. Rep. No. 1203, 77th Cong.
1st Ses. (1947).
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spouses in all states. 8 However, Congress did nothing to solve the
problem until 1942.
During the 1930-1942 period the approach of the Supreme
Court to the subject of federal taxation was undergoing a change
which has profoundly influenced the development of the basic
concepts of taxability. While the Court had only one case before
it which dealt with a taxation-community property question dur-
ing the period54 the reasoning expressed in its opinions in the
field of federal taxation was clearly inconsistent with the rationale
of Poe v. Seaborn and consistent with that expressed by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Lucas v. Earl and Corliss v. Bowers, i.e., the opinions
indicated an intention to disregard refinements of title and to tax
the person who had control of the income or property and derived
the actual benefit from it. 5 Consequently, the writers dealing
with the problem near the end of the period felt certain that if
Poe v. Seaborn were presented to the Court in 1940 or 1942 in-
stead of 1930 it would have been decided the other way. 6 Had
the Bureau presented the Court with another test case at that time
the Court could doubtless have overruled Poe v. Seaborn if it
felt the urge, by using the same procedure it had used in Helver.
ing v. Hallock57 in overruling the St. Louis Trust cases.58 It could
53 For an excellent analysis of the arguments for and against each of the three pro-
posals and the proposals for obtaining equality of treatment in estate and gift tax cases
as well, see Ray, Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 397, 408-
425, 532-545 (1942); see also, Altman, Community Property and Joint Returns, 19
TAXES 588 (1941).
54 Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264, 58 S. Ct. 880 (1938), involving the extent
to which proceeds of life insurance policies purchased with community funds should
be included in the gross estate of the insured.
55 See, INCOME TAXATION, Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1930);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 149 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940) ; ESTATE TAXATION, Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S.
106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940) ; Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933).
Gir TAXATION, Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933).
56 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 1901. Ray, Proposed Changes
in Federal Taxation, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 397, 407 (1942); Oliver, Community Property
and the Taxation of Family Income, 20 TEX. L. REv. 532, 555 (1942); Altman, Com-
munity Property in Peril, 19 TAXES 262 (1941); Lowndes, Community Income and
Alimony. 20 TAXES 3 (1941).
5,309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
5s St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. U. S., 296 U. S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74 (1935) ; Becker v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78 (1935).
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have said that the decisions in U. S. v. Robbins and Lucas v. Earl
furnish the "harmonizing principle" of which Poe v. Seaborn
was but an incorrect application. And any contention that con-
tinued administrative practice and continued reenactment without
change in the statute indicated legislative concurrence in the rule
of Poe v. Seaborn would probably have been answered by a fur-
ther reference to the Hallock decision wherein Mr. Justice Frank-
furter had said: "We walk in quicksand when we try to find in
the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle."
Whether that would be a sufficient answer in a field in which our
Congressmen had been forcefully expressing themselves (as evi-
denced by the reception the Bureau's mandatory joint return pro-
posal had received) is perhaps questionable. Certainly the Court
would have been subjected to much criticism, and even if it had
reversed its earlier position the result would not have been parti-
cularly desirable since imposition of a tax solely on the basis of
control of the income would have reversed the hardship. Since
the husband generally has control of the income in the community
property states he would be taxed on the entire income even though
the wife earned part of it. Similarly, he would be taxed on the
entire income even though a portion of it was income from the
wife's separate property, while under like circumstances a couple
in a common law state could file separate returns. Thus it was
clear that the proper solution to the problem lay in legislative
rather than judicial action.
It was at that point the Revenue Act of 1942, acclaimed the
greatest tax bill in American history,69 was enacted. The Act con-
tained sections ° which amended §§ 811 (e) and 811 (g) of the
Internal Revenue Code by adding the following:
h"(2) Community interests.-To the extent of the interest therein
held as community property by the decedent and surviving spouse
under the law of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States,
59 Kauper, Significant Developments in the Law of Federal Taxation, 1941-1947,
45 MicH. L Rzv. 659, 660 (1947).
60 H 402(b) (2) and 404(a).
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or any foreign country, except such part thereof as may be shown
to have been received as compensation for personal services actu-
ally rendered by the surviving spouse or derived originally from such
compensation or from separate property of the surviving spouse.
In no case shall such interest included in the gross estate of the decedent
be less than the value of such part of the community property as was
subject to the decedent's power of testamentary disposition."
§ 811(g) "(4) Community property.-For the purposes of this sub-
section, premiums or other consideration paid with property held as
community property by the insured and surviving spouse under the
law of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or any
foreign country, shall be considered to have been paid by the insured,
except such part thereof as may be shown to have been received as
compensation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving
spouse or derived originally from such compensation or from separate
property of the surviving spouse; and the term 'incidents of ownership'
includes incidents of ownership possessed by the decedent at his death
as manager of the community."
The Act contained a section"' which added § 1000 (d) to the
Code. § 1000 (d) read as follows:
"(d) COMMUNITY PROPERTY.-All gifts of property held as
community property under the law of any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States, or any foreign country shall be considered to be
the gifts of the husband except that gifts of such property as may be
shown to have been received as compensation for personal services
actually rendered by the wife or derived originally from such com-
pensation or from separate property of the wife shall be considered to
be gifts of the wife."
In the preparation of the Act the Bureau had once again done
its best to obtain the enactment of the mandatory joint return
provision. Secretary Morgenthau spoke not only of the discrimina-
tion between community and non-community property states but
also of the great loss of revenue suffered by allowing married
couples to file separate returns, pointing out that aproximately
$300,000,000 was being lost annually throughout the nation be-




gifts of property to one another, by filing of separate returns in
community property states, etc.62 However, the plea of the Bureau
was not adopted by the committee and when the Bill was reported
out it contained only the estate and gift tax provisions set out
above.63
The new additions to the estate and gift tax law were soon made
the subject of biting criticism and suggestion that they be repealed
or declared unconstitutional." A part of the criticism was certainly
justified since the sections were not carefully drafted and were
approved without extended hearings or discussion. The result
was the presence of several technical defects65 which were partially
corrected by administrative action. 6 The balance of the criticism,
the attack made on the constitutionality of the sections when
viewed in retrospect assumes the character of a last ditch stand
which never had a chance. An analysis of the developments in the
field of federal taxation up to that date shows an unbroken chain
of circumstances pointing to a holding by the Court that the new
sections were constitutional. Even if one had believed that the
rationale of Poe v. Seaborn still controlled the Court's thinking
in income tax cases involving community property questions no
such belief was justified in the estate tax field. The Court had
announced the basis on which the new section 811 (e) (2) would
be held constitutional as early as 1910 in Moffitt v. Kelly67 and
had reaffirmed it in the tenancy by the entireties cases6" and the
joint tenancy cases.6 9 Nevertheless, considerable care was exer-
62 Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7378, 78th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1942). p. 9-10. "
(:3 Report of the Committee of Ways and Means on H. R. 7378, 1942-2 Cum. Bull.
372.
84 Jackson. New Federal Estate and Gift Taxes on Community Property, 21 TAXES
535 (1943); Frieland, Community Property and Its Federal Tax Problems, 23 TAXES
326 (1945) DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 255 (1943).
65 See: Winstead, Estate Taxation of Community Property, 24 TEX. L. Rev. 34,
footnote 32, and Winstead, Aftermath of the Herbst and Wiener Decisions, 24 TEx. L.
Rev. 439. 449-453 (1945-46).
66 Note 65 supra. p. 449-453.
8 7218 U. S. 400, 31 S. Ct. 79 (1910).
1s Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930).
69 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939).
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cised in the selection and presentation to the Court of two test
cases, Fernandez v. Wiener and United States v. Rompel.7 In each
case the decedent had been a resident of a community property
state. (Wiener a resident of Louisiana, Herbst a resident of
Texas). The decedents' executors had filed estate tax returns in
which they had reported only one-half the value of the community
property. The Commissioner thereupon assessed deficiencies which
were paid in each case and suits for refund were instituted. In
each case the District Courts gave judgment for the executors on
the ground that the new code sections violated the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. 7' In two opinions delivered by
Chief Justice Stone, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
S 811 (e) (2) and 811 (g) (4) and reversed the District Courts; 72
saying:
"The principles which sustain the present tax against due process
objections are precisely those which sustained the California tax,
measured by the entire value of community property in Moffitt v. Kelly,
supra.1
73
During the period in which the critics of the 1942 amendments
to the Code were planning their attack which culminated in the
Fernandez v. Wiener decision they suffered a blow at the hands
of the Court which doubtless gave them an indication of the re-
ception they were to receive. That blow was the Court's decision
in Commissioner v. Harmon.74 In 1939 Oklahoma had adopted a
consensual community property law,75 apparently for the purpose
70 Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340, 66 S. Ct. 178 (1945).
United States v. Rompel (Herbst), 326 U. S. 367, 66 S. Ct. 191 (1945).
An attempt to test the constitutionality of § 811 (e) (2) indirectly by a state action
involving Wiener failed when the U. S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the
Louisiana Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction, 321 U. S. 253, 64 S. Ct. 548
(1944), see, Jackson, The Wiener Case, 18 TULANE L. REv. 525 (1944). For the back-
ground of the Rompel case, see, Weeks, The Test Cases, 18 TEx. B. J. 217 (1944).
71 Wiener v. Fernandez, 60 F. Supp. 169 (1945).
Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483 (1945).
72 Note 70. supra.
78 326 U. S. 340. 357.
74 323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
75 Okla. Sess. Laws of 1939, c. 62, Art. 2.
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of securing the advantages of income splitting to its married citi-
zens.76 Mr. Harmon immediately took advantage of the new law
and he and his wife filed separate returns on their community
income received between the effective date Novembr 1, 1939 and
Dcember 31, 1939. The Commisioner denied that right to split
the income and assessed a deficiency. The Tax Court77 and the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit7" held for the taxpayer.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower
courts79 on the ground that the consensual aspect of the Okla-
homa Act served to distinguish the case from Poe v. Seaborn and
bring it within Lucas v. Earl. The writer of the opinion was Mr.
Justice Roberts, the author of Poe v. Seaborn. A dissent by
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred in by Mr. Justice Black, indicated
what they thought of the desirability of retaining the rule of Poe
v. Seaborn when Mr. Justice Douglas said:
"I do not mean to defend Poe v. Seaborn. I only say that if we are to
stand by it, we should not allow it to become a 'vested' interest of only
a few of the states. The truth of the matter is that Lucas v. Earl and
Helvering v. Clifford on the one hand and Poe v. Seaborn on the other
state competing theories of income tax liability. Or to put it another
way, Poe v. Seaborn has been carved out as an exception to the general
rules of liability for income taxes. If we are to create such exceptions
we should do so uniformly. We should not allow the rationale of Poe
v. Seaborn to be good for one group of states and for one group only.
If we are to abandon the rationale of Poe v. Seaborn, we should do so
openly and avowedly. If the practical consequences of applying the
rationale of Poe v. Seaborn to other situations would be disastrous to
federal finance, it is time to reexamine the case. The rule which it
fashions is the rule of this Court. We have the responsibility for its
creation. If we adhere to it, we should apply it without discrimination.
If we are not to apply it equally to all states, we should be rid of it.
This is the time to face the issue squarely. 'B0
16 Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act. 2 LI. L REv. 575, 576 (1940).
77 1TC 40 (1942).
Ts 139 F (2d) 211, (CA.10. 1943).
79 Note 74. supra.
80 323 U. S. 44, 56, 65 S. Ct. 103, 109.
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When the decisions in Commissioner v. Harmon and Fernandez
v. Wiener are read together and one notes the unwillingness of
even Mr. Justice Roberts to extend Poe v. Seaborn it is clear that
by the end of 1945 a second climax in the struggle between com-
munity property and federal tax concepts had been reached and
that this time the tax concepts stood in the paramount position.
The victory was predicted on the now secure premise that federal
tax law, not local law, determines what is to be taxed; but it was
a hollow victory, for the Court was in no better position to over-
rule Poe v. Seaborn at that time than it was in 1942 when it faced
the obstacles of stare decisis, administrative practice and continued
reenactment, and Congress declined to act for reasons of its own.
Thus, following the Harmon decision, Hawaii adopted a com-
munity property statute in 1945. Oklahoma corrected the defect
in its community property statute by making it mandatory rather
than consensual, whereupon the Bureau permitted Oklahoma
spouses to split their income on separate returns.8' Oregon, which
had followed Oklahoma's lead in 1943," without waiting for the
Harmon decision in the Supreme Court, repealed its law in 1945
and then reenacted it in 1947;" and by 1948 Michigan, Nebraska
and Pennsylvania had also joined the ranks of the community
property states, though Pensylvania immediately dropped out
when its Supreme Court declared its law unconstitutional.8"
The rush of the common law states to the community property
band wagon prompted a reexamination of the problem of taxing
the family and was in large measure responsible for a study
made by the Treasury in 1947 entitled "The Tax Treatment of
Family Income." The Treasury described five possible methods
by which the dilemma might be resolved but did not recommend
adoption of any one of them; they were (1) taxing earned income
to the earner, (2) legalized family partnerships, (3) contractual
s 1. T. 3782, 1946.1 Cum. Bull. 84.
82 Oregon Laws, 1943, ch. 440.
s Oregon Laws, 1947, cl. 525.
s, Wilcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 A. (2d) 521 (Pa. 1947).
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splitting, (4) mandatory joint returns and (5) optional splitting. 5
The relative merits of the proposals were reviewed by various
writers," and while it appeared that the mandatory joint return
might have been the most satisfactory solution to the problem,
the consensus was that the optional splitting proposal had the best
chance of congressional acceptance, particularly if coupled with
a repeal of the 1942 amendments to §§ 811 (e), 811 (g) and
§ 1000, and the addition of split estate and gift provisions.8 7 The
Special Tax Study Committee which had been appointed by the
House Committee on Ways and Means to study tax problems gen-
erally, recommended incorporation of the optional splitting pro-
visions in the 1948 revenue bill 8 and that recommendation was
followed by the Ways and Means Committee. The consensus proved
to be correct and when the Revenue Act of 1948 was passed on
April 2, 1948, over presidential veto, it contained the now fa-
miliar optional splitting provisions.
The enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948 confirmed the
opinion of many that the non-community property states which
had adopted community property laws in 1945, 1946 and 1947
had done so for the sole purpose of obtaining the tax advantages
offered, for those states immediately began repealing their com-
munity property statutes.8 9 Since the enactment the taxpayers of
the country have filed income tax returns for two years as well
85 Lest anyone presume that the idea of allowing husbands and wives in non-com-
munity property states to split their income for tax purposes is of recent origin it
should be noted that it was first suggested in Maggs, Community Property and the
Federal Income Tax, 14 WASH. L. REV. 351, 448 (1926).
86 See: Excellent comment, Proposals for Preventing Family Tax Avoidance, 57
YALE L. J. 788, 798-803 (1948); Foley, Federal Corrective for Community Property
Inequity, 26 TAXES 236 (1948); James, The Income of Married Couples, 26 TAXES
311 (1948).
87 Surry, The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1105 (1948).
88 Report of the Special Tax Study Committee; reprinted, 25 TAXES 1029, 1035
(1947).
89 Michigan, Act. 39, 1948 (ex. Sea.), p. 95.
Oklahoma, Laws 1949, p. 229, §1.
Oregon, Laws 1949, ch. 350.
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as many estate returns and to date there has been little criticism
of the optional splitting provisions.9"
CONCLUSION
It was noted in the course of the hearings on the 1948 revenue
bill that it was politically impossible to take from the community
property states the advantages accorded them by Poe v. Seaborn.
91
Consequently, if past experience is any guide to the future the
fact that married couples in all forty-eight states have now had
a taste of the advantages offered by the optional splitting pro-
visions serves as an assurance that those provisions will remain in
the Code indefinitely. Actually the same end result might have
been reached via the mandatory joint return route which would
have simultaneously closed the door on the use of family partner-
ships, interfamily gifts and trusts as income splitting devices;
9.2
but as Chairman Millikin reminded a witness during the hearing:
"The only difficulty with it [the mandatory joint return proposal]
is that you can not get the votes to make a law out of it." 93
It is impossible to say whether the adoption of a mandatory joint
return provision would have improved our federal tax structure
more than the optional splitting provisions. It can, however, be
stated with certainty that the optional splitting provisions which
have been characterized as a "presently acceptable solution to
the family income problem"" are a direct consequence of the
90 There is some indication that the marital deduction provisions of the Code are
defective and having created new inequalities of treatment as between taxpayers in
community property and common law states. De Wind, The Approaching Crisis in
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 86 (1950).
91 Hearings before Committee on Finance on H. R. 4790, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 282,
404-407.
92 The disadvantage of mandatory joint returns were noted in Note 86, supra. The
constitutionality of a mandatory joint return provision has been discussed ad nauseaum,
the center of the discussion being the case of Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S.
206. That such a provision would be constitutional is now generally accepted, the basis
being Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in his concurring opinion in Fernandez v. Wiener,
"But I see no reason why that which is in fact an economic unit [the family] may not
be treated as one in law." 326 U. S. 340, 365.
93 Note 91. supra. at 272.
94 Note 87, supra. at 1106.
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conflict between community property law concepts and the con-
cepts of federal taxation which began as a minor skirmish in 1920.
It is difficult to credit a victory in the conflict to either com-
munity property law or federal tax law. While it might appear
on the surface that community property law had won since it in-
fluenced legislation, beneath the surface one finds that the concept
of taxable income which has been evolving through Supreme Court
decisions since 1920 has not been affected by community property
concepts except momentarily in 1930 by the decision in Poe v.
Seaborn. However, of greater significance is the indictment which
the history of the conflict levels at us for our failure to recognize
the separateness of federal tax concepts. The statement by Mr.
Altman in 1943 in the course of his analysis of the 1942 Act
changes in the gift tax sections of the Code is an example. He
said: "To federal taxation, riveted as it is to the common law, the
law of community property has become and insoluble paradox.""5
The apparent truth of that statement lies in our failure to use the
common law and the law of community property as they should
be used for tax purposes, simply as a guide to tell us what con-
sequences flow from the application of those laws to any given
transaction. Once the consequences are determined the task then
becomes one of determining whether Congress intended to tax
them, and determination of that intent is not reached by reference
to local law.
Mr. Randolph Paul has recently reminded us of the responsi-
bilities of the tax adviser9 and a review of the history of the
community property-taxation conflict raises again the question of
whether we are not attempting to escape that responsibility when
we fail to apply objectively the concepts of taxable income
announced by the Supreme Court.
95 Altman, Community Property and the Gilt Tax, 21 TAxYM 429 (1943).
9 8 Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 1950 Paoc mINis OF TAx INsTi-
TUTE, UNrVEaSITY OF SOUTHIN CALIFORNIA, p. 1.
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